Fully aware of the threat of nuclear terrorism, Kazakhstan believes, as do others, that there’s a need to strengthen state control over the nuclear activities on its territory and to take all necessary measures to prevent nuclear materials and technologies from falling into the hands of terrorists.

Kazakhstan fully shares and supports the ideas of the Global Nuclear Security Summit and makes every possible effort at the national and international levels to effectively implement resolutions taken at the first Summit that was held in Washington in April 2010.

Over the past two years, the Republic of Kazakhstan has been actively working to implement the decisions of the Washington Summit, as outlined in its Communiqué and Working Plan, and has achieved significant progress in this direction.

Nuclear security issues were constantly on the agenda of the State Commission on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. These two years have passed under the slogan of "From Words to Deeds".

At the initiative of President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, a Conference on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism dedicated to stopping the financing of terrorism and the inaugural meeting of the Group for the implementation and evaluation were held in Astana in September 2010.

A unique operation of transportation and disposal of spent nuclear fuel from the world's first fast breeder reactor BN-350 to a long-term storage was completed by Kazakhstan in cooperation with Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and the IAEA in November 2010. The implementation of this unprecedented project within one year has ensured the security of enough nuclear material to build 800 nuclear bombs, thus making a significant contribution to international security and nuclear non-proliferation.

In addition, a unique project of downblending 33 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Institute of Nuclear Physics and transfer it into the form of low-enriched uranium (LEU) was completed at the Kazakhstan nuclear fuel plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk in December 2011.

Also, currently underway is a project to convert the WWR-K research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics to low-enriched fuel: the new reactor core calculations have been made, a pilot sample of fuel has been made in Russia which is passing a test in accordance with safety regulatory requirements. Upon the results of these tests, a decision will be made on the loading the reactor with the new LEU fuel. This work is scheduled to be completed in 2014 and is supported by the U.S. Department of Energy.

Highly enriched spent nuclear fuel from the WWR-K research reactor has been moved to Russia as agreed earlier.

The work on nuclear security at the former Semipalatinsk test site continues in cooperation with the United States and Russia. The main part of the project -- eliminating the infrastructure of the testing site -- has been completed, and the building of physical barriers around and the work for physical protection of sensitive areas of the site are nearing completion.

Kazakhstan embraces international cooperation and unambiguously supports the leadership role of the IAEA in the sphere of global nuclear security.

In July 2011, Kazakhstan applied to host the IAEA international bank of LEU nuclear material. The bank would assure supply of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants in countries developing peaceful nuclear energy. In cooperation with the IAEA, we have begun drafting the host country agreement.

In January 2012, in cooperation with the United States, Kazakhstan conducted exercises to respond to a radiological incident during transportation of nuclear materials.
The Republic of Kazakhstan officially joined the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction in January 24, 2012.

In February 2012, under the Implementation Agreement between the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Japan-Kazakhstan Committee on Cooperation for the elimination of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan. Contracts were signed between the Committee and two Kazakh organizations - the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and the Institute of Nuclear Physics - on strengthening the system of physical protection of sites of these organizations. The project is scheduled to be implemented at the Institute of Nuclear Physics within the next year and at the Ulba plant within three years. These projects will improve the physical security of Kazakhstan's nuclear facilities and contribute to strengthening global nuclear security.

Training is an important factor in strengthening the security culture in nuclear activities. Therefore, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy a project to develop the Kazakhstan Regional Training Centre for accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities has been launched. It is assumed that in addition to traditional courses in accounting, control and physical protection, the application of international safeguards, the program of the Center will also include the issues of combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Kazakhstan attained the first place in the world for uranium ore extraction. A reliable accounting system and control of natural uranium contributes to the overall level of nuclear safety. The National Atomic Company "Kazatomprom" has launched a pilot project along these lines in conjunction with the IAEA and the U.S. Department of Energy and we are ready to share the results of our work together.

As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, Kazakhstan attaches great importance to maintaining an effective export control system that prevents the illegal transfer of nuclear materials and technology. Requirements for internal compliance systems for the nuclear fuel cycle have been introduced to improve the efficiency of the export controls system at the legislative level.

Kazakhstan believes that regional cooperation plays an important role in combating illegal circulation of nuclear materials and technology. In this context, we urge to pay more attention to nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs), under which it is possible to establish effective mechanisms for sharing information and experience in law enforcement, customs and border control in order to ensure nuclear security.

To demonstrate and disseminate good practices and benefits of such zones, it is necessary to first secure their legal status. First of all, it means providing negative security assurances to States that are parties to nuclear-free zones by nuclear-weapon states. It is also possible to develop and adopt other mechanisms of different preferences for the member states of the NWFZs. For our part, we have proposed to develop, in the framework of the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (signed in 2006 in Semipalatinsk), a regional action plan to improve nuclear safety, prevent illegal trafficking of nuclear materials and combat nuclear terrorism. The plan is now under consideration by states that are party to the Semipalatinsk Treaty.

Kazakhstan believes that it is necessary to develop and strengthen the international legal framework for nuclear security. Our government has acceded to almost all the conventions in this field. Last year, we ratified the amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and call upon all States participating in the initiative of the Global Nuclear Security Summit to adopt measures to ratify it soon so that it can come into force by 2014.

One of the important tasks, we believe, is the introduction of various mechanisms to encourage and promote the transition of the commercial nuclear sector from highly enriched uranium based technologies to low enriched ones. First of all, it should be a system of economic preferences, which would help to practically implement the idea of the Summit to minimize the use of HEU in the civilian sector. In developing such a system it is necessary to examine carefully how important isotopes could impact on the market, and other possible consequences,
so as not to disrupt the current state of things. The commercial sector cannot be forced by simple statements to move to technology without highly enriched uranium. It is very important that states take practical steps to accommodate producers in order to achieve real results.