Economics & Global Affairs

28 Items

President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump pose for a photo with Chinese President Xi Jingping and his wife, Mrs. Peng Liyuan, Thursday, April 6, 2017, at the entrance of Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, FL (Official White Photo by D. Myles Cullen)

Official White Photo by D. Myles Cullen

Magazine Article - The Atlantic

What Xi Jinping Wants

| May 31, 2017

"Within a month of becoming China’s leader in 2012, Xi specified deadlines for meeting each of his 'Two Centennial Goals.' First, China will build a 'moderately prosperous society' by doubling its 2010 per capita GDP to $10,000 by 2021, when it celebrates the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. Second, it will become a 'fully developed, rich, and powerful' nation by the 100th anniversary of the People's Republic in 2049. If China reaches the first goal— which it is on course to do—the IMF estimates that its economy will be 40 percent larger than that of the U.S. (measured in terms of purchasing power parity). If China meets the second target by 2049, its economy will be triple America's."

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Correspondence: Debating China's Rise and the Future of U.S. Power

| Fall 2016

William Z.Y. Wang responds to Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth's winter 2015/16 article, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position."

Chinese President Xi Jinping is displayed on a big screen in Beijing as Chinese battle tanks roll by during a Sept. 3, 2015 parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of Japan's surrender during World War II.

(AP Photo)

Magazine Article - The Atlantic

The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?

| September 24, 2015

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged.

In this photo taken Feb. 9, 2014, clouds loom over Sinopec oil refinery in Qingdao in China's Shandong province.

AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Is There an Oil Weapon? Security Implications of Changes in the Structure of the International Oil Market

    Authors:
  • Llewelyn Hughes
  • Austin Long
| Winter 2014/15

States have long worried that their dependence on oil gives producers a means of coercion. The oil market, however, is far larger and more integrated than it used to be. The potential for coercion differs across a series of distinct market segments. In this varied market, the United States remains the dominant force.

U.S. flag and China's flag flutter in winds at a hotel in Beijing Wednesday, Sept. 5, 2012.

Andy Wong/ AP

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Primacy or World Order? The United States and China's Rise—A Review Essay

| Winter 2013/14

How should the United States respond to China’s rise? What are China’s strategic goals? What are the implications of U.S.-China strategic interactions for world order? This review essay examines the answers provided by three recent works—Aaron Friedberg’s A Contest for Supremacy, Hugh White’s The China Choice, and Yan Xuetong’s Ancient Chinese Political Thought, Modern Chinese Power.

U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons based at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, prepare for the first flight of exercise Red Flag-Alaska 12-1 at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Oct. 7, 2011.

SSgt Christopher Boitz

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Military Primacy Doesn't Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)

    Author:
  • Daniel W. Drezner
| Summer 2013

A common argument among scholars and policymakers is that America’s military preeminence and deep international engagement yield significant economic benefits to the United States and the rest of the world. Ostensibly, military primacy, beyond reducing security tensions, also encourages economic returns through a variety of loosely articulated causal mechanisms. A deeper analytical look reveals the causal pathways through which military primacy is most likely to yield economic returns: geoeconomic favoritism, whereby the military hegemon attracts private capital in return for providing the greatest security and safety to investors; direct geopolitical favoritism, according to which sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of the military superpower, voluntarily transfer resources to help subsidize the costs of hegemony; and the public goods benefits that flow from hegemonic stability. A closer investigation of these causal mechanisms reveals little evidence that military primacy attracts private capital. The evidence for geopolitical favoritism seems more robust during periods of bipolarity than unipolarity. The evidence for public goods benefits is strongest, but military predominance plays only a supporting role in that logic. While further research is needed, the aggregate evidence suggests that the economic benefits of military hegemony have been exaggerated in policy circles. These findings have significant implications for theoretical debates about the fungibility of military power and should be considered when assessing U.S. fiscal options and grand strategy for the next decade.

Magazine Article - American Interest

Our Pacific Predicament

| March/April 2013

"American interests rest on stability in the region to allow the continuing growth of trade and investment that benefits all countries. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains crucial to stability in East Asia, but so too are good relations in all three sides of the strategic triangle. One thing is clear: If, despite all we do, Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate toward literal conflict, the United States will be faced with some very tough choices."