Economics & Global Affairs

14 Items

Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, left, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, right, wear helmets at the Durusu metering station, near the northern Turkish city of Samsun, Thursday, Nov. 17, 2005.

Reuters/AP

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

The Russian Reality Check on Turkey's Gas Hub Hopes

| January 2016

On Nov 24, 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet after it veered into its airspace for 17 seconds. On December 13, a Russian ship fired warning shots at a Turkish vessel in the Aegean Sea. Bilateral tensions, with overt military dimensions, have seemed to quickly replace the goodwill that characterized relations only a year ago.

Gas flares are seen at the Rumaila oil refinery, near the city of Basra, 550 kilometers (340 miles) southeast of Baghdad, Iraq.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Oil, Conflict, and U.S. National Interests

    Author:
  • Jeff D. Colgan
| October 2013

The influence of oil on conflict is often poorly understood. In U.S. public debates about the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, both sides focused excessively on the question of whether the United States was fighting for possession of oil reserves; neither sought a broader understanding of how oil shaped the preconditions for war.

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Why America Should Not Retrench

| March 2013

The United States' extended system of security commitments creates a set of institutional relationships that foster political communication. Alliance institutions are first about security protection, but they also bind states together and create institutional channels of communication. For example, NATO has facilitated ties and associated institutions that increase the ability of the United States and Europe to talk to each other and to do business. Likewise, the bilateral alliances in East Asia also play a communication role beyond narrow security issues. Consultations and exchanges spill over into other policy areas. This gives the United States the capacity to work across issue areas, using assets and bargaining chips in one area to make progress in another.

Customers shop for vegetables at a supermarket in Hangzhou, China, 14 Oct. 2011. China’s inflation eased somewhat in September, but food costs, a major force behind price rises, remained stubbornly high by jumping 13.4 percent, the same as in August.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

To Stay Ahead of China, Stay Engaged in Asia

| January 2012

"China narrowed the gap in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and will likely overtake the United States as the world's largest economy sometime between 2015 and 2040. What matters for national power, however, is not gross wealth, but net wealth—the wealth left over after people are clothed and fed. China's 1.3 billion people produce a large volume of output, but they also consume most of it immediately, leaving little left over for national purposes."

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta escorts South Korean President Lee Myung-bak into the Pentagon, Oct. 12, 2011.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - United States Institute of Peace

Mr. Lee Goes to Washington

| October 12, 2011

"Amid setbacks and chronic challenges in almost every major region, Washington views South Korea as a linchpin on a global scale. From hosting the G20 summit in 2010 to preparing to host the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, South Korea has been establishing itself as a global partner in addressing common challenges, ranging from rebalancing the international economy to preventing the use of nuclear materials for terrorist attacks. For President Lee, the state visit is an important opportunity to demonstrate South Korea’s unique role as a bridge between the developed and developing countries."

In a Sep. 28, 2010 photo released by Korean Central News Agency via Korea News Service, delegates clap in unison during the ruling Workers' Party representatives meeting in Pyongyang, North Korea.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - United States Institute of Peace

North Korea's Leadership Succession: The China Factor

| September 28, 2010

On September 28, North Korean state media announced that Kim Jong-il's third son, Kim Jong-eun, was promoted to the rank of four-star general just prior to the opening of the Workers' Party of Korea conference. Kim Jong-eun was later named vice chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission at the conference. These important developments follow the late August meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Changchun, near the Sino-DPRK border, which appears to have cleared the way for this Party conference. After the meeting, both countries' state media reported the leaders' support for the rising generation of the Party — a clear reference to Kim Jong-eun.

Policy Brief

What Accounts for the Success of Islamist Parties in the Arab World

Islamist organizations are generally considered to be the strongest and most credible opposition to incumbent regimes throughout the Arab world. Fear of Islamic takeovers has led regimes and outside powers to justify the suppression of free elections by citing the Algerian election of 1991, the Iranian Revolution, the AKP victory in Turkey, and the perceived popularity of Islamist opposition groups throughout much of the Arab world (Brumberg 2002). Yet, other analysts have questioned the actual strength of Islamist movements, noting that although Islamists may be the main challengers, few have actually been successful in taking power (Roy 1994).

Policy Brief

Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance

The swiftness with which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has launched its civil nuclear program presents a number of challenges for policymakers in seeking to ensure the program's safety and security. At the onset of its efforts, the UAE government consulted with a set of the world's leading nuclear suppliers to develop a framework that would help its nuclear program conform to the highest standards in terms of safety, security, and nonproliferation. The UAE drew on these consultations in making a sweeping set of international commitments in April 2008 to ensure that the sensitive nuclear materials and technologies it would acquire as part of its nuclear program would be securely controlled.1 While the UAE has been widely praised for the depth and breadth of the nonproliferation commitments it has made, it will be the UAE's efficacy at complying with them by which its success will be judged.

President Barack Obama welcomes China's Vice Preier Wang Qishan, left, as he opens the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington, Monday, July 27, 2009.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Improving U.S.-China Relations: The Next Steps

| August 2009

A higher Renminbi will have two advantages: for the United States, it will help to equilibrate the past trade imbalance; for China, it will stimulate consumption (and enhance imports). It will therefore help China switch from a purely exporting strategy to one that maintains domestic growth through internal consumption.  The goods that were to be sent abroad can now be consumed by an increasingly middle class nation at home.  These steps will bring China and the United States closer economically and increase international stability. However, unless the military-security relations of the two countries improve, this will not be a sufficient remedy for the two nations' long term problems.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, (L), gestures as U.S. President Barack Obama listens to him during their meeting ahead of the G20 summit in London, April 1, 2009.

AP Photo

Policy Brief

Improving Russia-U.S. Relations: The Next Steps

| June 2009

There is no endemic reason for Russian-U.S. relations to be as tense as they have become over the past several years. Th is situation is largely due, on one side, to mishandling of Russian affairs by both the Clinton and Bush administrations, and on the other by the obvious manipulation of anti-Americanism for domestic gain by the Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev administrations in Russia. Unfortunately, this means that only unilateral U.S. action can undermine the cynical policies of the Russian leadership and restore dynamism to the Russian-U.S. relationship.