Journal Article - Intelligence and National Security
Missing Revolution: The American Intelligence Failure in Iraq, 1958
Why were American officials caught by surprise with the military coup and later revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958? Drawing on American intelligence and diplomatic records as well as multilingual sources, this article argues that the US intelligence failure is the product of two factors: the collection of information from too few and too similar human sources of intelligence in Iraq's ruling regime, and the unreceptivity of US officials to assessing new information and their unwillingness to update assessments of local Iraqi developments. It revisits America's intelligence failure in Iraq and suggests important lessons for the study of intelligence.
Karam, Jeffrey G. "Missing Revolution: The American Intelligence Failure in Iraq, 1958." Intelligence and National Security, vol. 32. no. 6. (October 2017): pp. 693–709.
Analysis & Opinions - The Washington Post
Analysis & Opinions - The Huffington Post
Analysis & Opinions - Prospect
In the Spotlight
Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security
Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School