512 Events

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Seminar - Open to the Public

The Past, Present, and Future Development of International Safeguards for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

Wed., Apr. 11, 2018 | 10:00am - 11:30am

1 Brattle Square - Room 350

Speaker: Mark Walker, Ph.D. Candidate in Science, Technology and Environmental Policy at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

This seminar presents the results of archival research undertaken in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany into the origins of international safeguards approaches for gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). Archival documents indicate that multilateral discourse on GCEP safeguards was dominated in the 1970s and early 1980s by political disagreements over a number of safeguards issues, including inspector effort, inspector access, and the role of the IAEA in verifying undeclared nuclear material and activities. While the gridlock that ensued over these questions necessitated the creation of the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP), a technical forum in which technology holders and inspectorates were to agree once and for all on an approach for safeguards at GCEPs, some contentious HSP issues (including the question of cascade access) were still largely resolved through political compromise. Following a discussion of the factors that led to the 1983 HSP safeguards approach, the legacy of the HSP approach on the state of play of modern GCEP safeguards will be discussed, along with paths forward for ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of GCEP safeguards in coming years.

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Seminar - Open to the Public

Solving the Jurisdictional Conundrum: The Use of Domestic Civil Courts to Disrupt Overseas Illicit Procurement

Wed., Apr. 4, 2018 | 10:00am - 11:30am

1 Brattle Square - Room 350

Speaker: Aaron Arnold, Associate Project on Managing the Atom; Assistant Professor at Curry College

Over the past two decades, the United States has increasingly turned to targeted sanctions and export restrictions, such as those imposed against Iran and North Korea, in order to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One vexing problem, however, is how to contend with jurisdictional hurdles when the violations occur overseas, in countries that are unable or unwilling to assist US enforcement efforts. To solve this problem, US prosecutors are turning to strategies with significant extraterritorial implications— that is, exercising legal authority beyond national borders. One such tool is to use civil legal procedures to seize assets linked to sanctions or export control violations in jurisdictions that lack cooperative arrangement with US enforcement agencies. While this may be an attractive strategy to bolster enforcement efforts against overseas illicit procurement such tools are not without consequence.

Seminar - Harvard Faculty, Fellows, Staff, and Students

Resilience, Risk, and Reinforcements for Arctic Communities on the Edge

Wed., Feb. 21, 2018 | 12:30pm - 1:45pm

John F. Kennedy School of Government - Taubman Building, Darman Seminar Room, First Floor

The Arctic Initiative will host a seminar with Joel Clement, former Director of the U.S. Department of the Interior's Policy Office, discussing risk and resilience of Arctic communities in the face of climate change.

Lunch will be provided.

A mockup of the Fat Man nuclear device.

U.S. Department of Defense

Seminar - Open to the Public

The Elite Taboo Against Using Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Wargames

Wed., Feb. 21, 2018 | 10:00am - 11:30am

John F. Kennedy School of Government - Littauer Building, Fainsod Room, Littauer-324

Speaker: Reid Pauly, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Is there a normative prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons? Recent scholarship has cast doubt on the existence of a norm of nuclear non-use among the American people. But the public does not make decisions about using nuclear weapons. In this presentation, Pauly investigates the willingness of American policymakers to use nuclear weapons through the history of political-military wargaming. He tests competing theories about the use and non-use of nuclear weapons by examining both whether strategic elites were willing to use nuclear weapons in different scenarios and how they explained those decisions.

Seminar - Open to the Public

The Madhouse Effect: How Climate Change Denial in the Trump Era Threatens our Planet, People, and Politics

Wed., Feb. 14, 2018 | 4:15pm - 5:45pm

John F. Kennedy School of Government - Starr Auditorium, Belfer Building, Floor 2.5

Through science, cartoons, and satire, the award-winning climate scientist Michael E. Mann and Pulitzer Prize-winning political cartoonist Tom Toles will take a provocative look at the impact of polarizing climate wars in the Trump era and years past. Their novel collaborative book, "The Madhouse Effect,” provides a powerful counterpunch to climate change denialism in the face of overwhelming scientific consensus.

Refreshments served.

JFK Jr Forum - Harvard Faculty, Fellows, Staff, and Students

Lessons from Iceland: A Nation Striving to Punch Above Its Weight in a Globalized World

Fri., Jan. 26, 2018 | 4:00pm

John F. Kennedy School of Government - Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum

A public address by His Excellency Guðni Thorlacius Jóhannesson, President of Iceland. Moderated by John Holdren, President Obama's Science Advisor and Director of the White Office of Science and Technology Policy (January 2009 – January 2017); Co-Director, Belfer Center's Science, Technology and Public Policy Program.

President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia sign the New START Treaty during a ceremony at Prague Castle in Prague, Czech Republic, April 8, 2010.

Chuck Kennedy/White House Photo

Seminar - Open to the Public

Strategic Stability after the end of Strategic Arms Control

Wed., Jan. 17, 2018 | 10:00am - 11:30am

John F. Kennedy School of Government - Littauer Building, Fainsod Room, Littauer-324

Speaker: Ambassador Linton Brooks

Russian violation of the INF Treaty means that it will be politically impossible to replace New START when it expires and even an extension may be difficult.  As a result, by 2026 at the latest and perhaps as soon as 2021, there will be—for the first time in half a century—no formal agreement regulating nuclear relations between Russia and the United States.  This presentation will discuss the resulting consequences for strategic stability and how they might be mitigated.  It will conclude that serious examination, both internally and bilaterally, should begin soon.