Global Governance of Nuclear Security

Towards a New Phase in Nuclear Security Cooperation

By Ambassador Klaus Korhonen                                         

The Fourth Nuclear Security Summit (NSS2016) takes place next year in the United States. The preparations by representatives of participating countries - so called Sherpas - have started. I am pleased to discuss the prospects of NSS2016 also with the readers of Nuclear Security Matters as a follow-up to a visit to Harvard University Belfer Center.

I cannot anticipate final recommendations of 53 national Sherpas, let alone the decisions of the Heads of States or Governments in the Summit. But let me offer a few initial thoughts from a Finnish perspective on what issues will be addressed and what could be some of the outcomes. Debate on these topics is going on and will continue.

Implementing International Mechanisms to Ensure the Security of Military Materials

Samantha Pitts-KieferBy Samantha Pitts-Kiefer

In the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, leaders from more than 50 countries “reaffirm[ed] the fundamental responsibility of States, in accordance with their respective obligations, to maintain at all times effective security of all nuclear and other radioactive materials, including nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control. This responsibility includes taking appropriate measures to prevent non-state actors from obtaining such materials – or related sensitive information or technology – which could be used for malicious purposes, and to prevent acts of terrorism and sabotage.”

Snapshot of Nonproliferation Budget Process for 2015

By Nickolas Roth

Last week, the House and Senate agreed on a budget to fund the federal government—including nonproliferation and nuclear security programs—through fiscal year 2015. Despite its participation in the Nuclear Security Summit earlier in 2014 and strong rhetoric from President Obama about the need to prioritize nuclear security, his administration proposed cutting spending on programs to strengthen security for nuclear weapons useable material for the third year in a row. In response, twenty-six Senators signed a letter to the Obama administration requesting that funding for nonproliferation and nuclear security programs be increased.

What Kind of Material Needs What Level of Security?

In August of 2002, the United States – assisted by a gift from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, when it turned out no U.S. agency had money that was not blocked from doing what was needed – helped airlift 48 kilograms of 80% enriched highly enriched uranium out of the Vinca nuclear research institute in Serbia.  A force of 1,200 armed troops guarded the shipment as it moved from the lab to the airport.  Under international rules, this was dangerous “Category I” material requiring the highest level of security. But under Department of Energy (DOE) rules for categorizing nuclear material, if the same material had been at a DOE site, it would have been considered “Category III” material requiring hardly any security.

Beyond the Summits: The Way Forward for Nuclear Security in the Middle East

By Nilsu Goren and Ariane Tabatabai
With the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) now over, policymakers are thinking about next steps to address nuclear security. The NSS process has progressed since its first installment in 2010; yet, the Middle East, a key region where nuclear security is of tremendous importance, remains underrepresented.

Progress at The Hague Nuclear Security Summit

By Matthew Bunn
So what did the nuclear security summit in The Hague accomplish?  A good deal.  Despite being overshadowed by the crisis in Ukraine and the associated crush of side meetings, the summit in The Hague once again served as a forcing event to cut through bureaucracy and get important decisions made.  Just as having friends over for dinner motivates you to clean up your house, going to a major global summit motivates leaders to push their bureaucracies to give them something worthwhile to talk about when they get there.

2014 Hague Summit

Documents from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit; includes official communique, national statements and progress reports, and joint statements/gift-baskets.

We're Not Prepared for a Nuclear Heist

By Eben Harrell
In September 2009, a group of masked men armed with automatic weapons and explosives arrived on the roof of a cash depot in Vastberg, Sweden in a helicopter. The men blasted their way through a skylight and hoisted millions of dollars up to the hovering aircraft — the operation took less than 20 minutes. When police rushed to respond they discovered a bag with the word “bomb” at their heliport — a diversion planted by the thieves — and caltrops (road spikes) near the depot to slow down their response on the ground. While many of the thieves were caught after an investigation, most of the money was never recovered. 

Getting to No

By Graham Allison
With Ukraine melting down and the confrontation between Russia and the West heating up, both partisan critics and impartial observers can be excused for asking why U.S. President Barack Obama is going to The Hague this Sunday, March 23, for the third Nuclear Security Summit. Given all the other urgent demands, should nuclear security be at the top of the agenda at this time, and even if it should be, can this gathering do anything about it?

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